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Introduction:
The peaceful transition from authoritarianism under Francisco Franco to a democratic
constitutional monarchy after Franco’s death stands as a critical juncture in modern Spanish
history because of the uniqueness of the historical event. The transition occurred without direct
foreign intervention to manipulate Spanish politicians into passing democratic legislation;
instead, the transition was initiated by Francoist leaders who willingly enacted the regime’s
change which undermined their initial place in society. Notably, this transition is unique to any
other authoritarian regime. The Spanish transition is the equivalent of Gorbachev convincing the
communist party to institute a democratic constitution to govern the USSR with free political
parties.1 Of course, this never happened in the USSR or any other authoritarian regime of this
nature, which is why the circumstances of Spain’s transition are so intriguing.2
Spain’s peaceful transition to democracy after the death of Francisco Franco was largely
attributed to the youth and progressivism of the leaders of the government and the willingness of
the Prime Minister and King to compromise with the liberal opposition and authoritarian
opposition. The transition also coincides with the public support of democracy, emulated in
university protests, mass labor strikes, pro-democratic terrorism, and the Catholic Church’s
detachment from the Franco regime. Furthermore, international influence impacted the speed in
which the country adopted democracy; the potential economic benefits of membership in the
European Union spurred on democratic sentiment, and the violent democratic revolution in
Portugal posed as an example to Spanish politicians of the harm of delayed democratic
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transition. By using scholarly literature to analyze Spanish history combined with references to
various newspaper articles to provide personal context of the transition, this essay will explore
how Spain successfully transitioned to a democracy after Francisco Franco’s death. The research
for this essay has found that the transition was made possible by public dissent against Franco,
international support for a democratic Spain in Europe, and the new generation of politicians
who sought progressive change.

Chapter 1: Historical Background
Section 1: Spain Before Franco
In December of 1931, a new constitution was ratified in Spain, establishing the Second
Republic. This new government established a democratic state, granting new freedoms to the
Spanish. Importantly, the Second Republic granted freedom of religion throughout Spain. As a
newly established government, the Second Republic struggled to maintain legitimacy and
popular support. By granting freedom of religion and thus alienating the Catholic Church, the
Second Republic lost a great source of legitimacy. This, combined with mass poverty caused by
the Great Depression and a steep national deficit, proved to be a heavy burden for the young
republic.3
Tensions were growing in the new republic and in July of 1936, a pronunciamiento ( coup
d'etat) was launched by the Spanish military, triggering the Spanish Civil War.4 This war was a
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struggle between two sides, the Republicans (who supported the Second Republic) and the
Nationalists (who supported an authoritarian state). Put prosaically, this was a conflict between
progress and tradition, or light and dark.5 The first weeks of the war proved to be chaotic for both
the Republicans and Nationalists. Anyone who was thought to be a conspirator with the
Nationalists became a target for mob violence that broke out as a reaction to the breakdown of
governmental authority. Furthermore, violence against the Church broke out in droves that left
7,000 clergymen dead as a result. Similarly, the Nationalists targeted anyone who seemed to
support the republican side or even appeared to be non-Catholic.6
Two months after the war had broken out, major European powers imposed an arms
embargo against Spain.7 This was caused by urges from France and Great Britain, who both
feared the Spanish Civil War would cause another world war.8 Despite the embargo, both sides
of the war received international aid. The Nationalists were sent military and logistical support
from the fascist regimes of Germany, Italy, and Portugal, while the Republicans were helped by
the USSR with supplies of arms and equipment aid.9 A unit of international volunteers known as
the International Brigade also provided military support for the Republicans to protect
democracy abroad. This was a contingent of international volunteers inspired to help the Spanish
squash the rise of facism. Among these troops were the Lincoln Brigade from the United States.
If it had not been for the International Brigade, the Republicans would probably not have
survived the later years of the war.10
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In March 1939, the Republicans officially surrendered to the facist Nationalists.11 On
April 1, 1939, Franco proclaimed, “Today, with the Red Army captive and disarmed, the
Nationalist troops have attained their final military objectives. The war has ended.” The 36 year
reign of the authoritarian dictator, Francisco Franco, had begun.12

Section 2: The Regime of Francisco Franco
Francisco Franco was appointed Generalísimo (the commander of all Spanish armed
forces) in September 1939.13 Franco was motivated by the belief that the state was ruled by
“God, fatherland, and family,” with deep sentiments for the protection of tradition and suspicion
of citizen politics.14 Francoism was defined by a rejection of democracy, liberalism, and
pluralism.15 His rule only comprised of series of repressions and concessions.16 For example,
labor unions were illegal under Franco but the regime gave laborers job security.17 In Franco’s
early stages of leadership, his regime gained some legitimacy through support from the Catholic
Church-- an aspect which the Second Republic had lacked. This alliance also provided
legitimacy for Spain in the eyes of international organizations and other states.18
The new regime was an authoritarian state which stripped personal freedom and enforced
control of every aspect of the Spanish commonwealth. The new state imposed strict censorship
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and encouraged political apathy to mute public opinion and political opposition. To snuff out
Republican sentiment, the Law of Political Responsibilities was passed in 1939. This law
effectively criminalized all who supported the Second Republic and the Republicans during the
Spanish Civil War. Between 1939 and 1945, more than 30,000 executions and 400,000
imprisonments took place based on this law alone. Franco sought to establish cultural
homogeneity as well. In efforts to achieve this, the regional languages of Catalonia, Galicia, and
the Basque Country were banned as official languages.19
Spain’s economy under Franco was defined by autarky and state intervention.20 Autarky
cut off Spain from foreign trade and focused on internal production which made Spanish industry
uncompetitive. Under state intervention, the regime seized control of Spanish resources which,
distorted the market.21 The Spanish economy of the early 20th century was heavily reliant on
agricultural production. In an effort to control all facets of Spain, the new regime collectivized
the agricultural sector with disastrous consequences.22 After collectivization, there was a spike in
food shortages, newfound necessity in rationing, and a national crisis over food.23 Between 1939
and 1945, 200,000 Spaniards are estimated to have died from hunger or related diseases.24
With a relatively new regime and an economy in shambles, Spain remained neutral
throughout World War II. Political support during the early years of the war certainly extended
to Hitler and the Axis Powers, but as the tide turned in favor of the Allied Powers winning the
war, so did Franco’s support. In 1945, the Spanish were denied international support for
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rehabilitation because of Franco’s initial support for the fascists of Germany and Italy. The
creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 explicitly excluded Spain from membership.
Furthermore, Spain was denied any aid from the Marshall Plan-- the U.S. initiative to provide
funds to restore war-torn Europe. Instead, the Spanish were meant to grovel in their own misery,
devoid of any foreign assistance.25
After years of suffering, Spain’s bad luck finally broke with the “Economic Miracle” of
the 1960s.26 The Stabilization Plan of 1959 was put into effect in order to semi-liberalize the
economy and reestablish foreign trade. It is no coincidence that this plan immediately followed
Spain’s membership in the UN and agreements made with the United States to receive aid, these
were leading influences in Franco’s decision to liberalize the Spanish economy.27 As a result, the
new decade of the 1960s brought rigorous economic improvement that included rising wages,
improved standards of living, rapid industrialization, and expansion of the middle class.28 The
prosperity of the 1960s gave rise to democratic sentiment, but it is no coincidence that economic
improvement also coincided with rising opposition to Franco’s authoritarian regime.

Section 3: On the Road to Democracy
On December 23, 1973, Carlos Arias Navarro became the head of the Spanish
government as the president.29 Arias committed to the immediate “democratic opening” upon
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taking his new position.30 In efforts to adopt a system in Spain fit for Juan Carlos as king, Arias
spearheaded what came to be known as the Spirit of February 12-- a pseudo-democratic program
inspired by a speech about political change orated by Arias on February 12, 1974. The program
consisted of three major reforms: increasing political participation of Francoists, democratizing
the Cortes, and democratizing the local governments. 31 However, these reforms failed.
The death of the Spirit of February 12 was caused by several factors. Firstly, Arias was a
weak politician who failed to overcome the influence of hardline dissent.32 Furthermore, in
March of 1974, the execution of a young Catalan terrorist-- who was accused of killing a
policeman in a shootout-- created upheaval and dissent from the Spanish and international
viewers.33 This state execution caused Franco, Arias’s government, and the reforms of the Spirit
of February 12 to lose support.34 On July 1, 1976, King Juan Carlos demanded the resignation of
Arias as Prime Minister, to be replaced by Adolfo Suárez.35
Upon Franco’s death in November 1975, democracy began to take a deeper hold in the
national government. In June 1976, the Law of Political Association was passed which legalized
political parties.36 Originally, party members were nervous to admit support for the Law of
Political Association out of fear it would frame them to be pro-Francoist (given the law was
sponsored by the Falangists, Francoist politicians); but, eagerness to legalize their party
outweighed the fear of conformity.37
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The Law of Political Reform was then passed in November, dissolving the Cortes. 38 This
marked the greatest success of Suárez and Juan Carlos’s first six months of collaboration.39 The
new law eliminated the role of dictator and established a bicameral legislature to be elected by
universal suffrage.40 On December 15, 1976, a referendum was held which found that 94.2% of
Spaniards support democratization.41 The referendum had incredible turnout as well. Excluding
the opposition regions (like Catalonia), no more than 10% of voters abstained.42 Following the
referendum was a rapid series of democratic changes. For example, diplomatic relations with
democratic nations began to blossom, all political parties (including the Communists) were
legalized, and labor unions and strikes were decriminalized.43
The first election since 1936 was held on June 15, 1977.44 Eighteen million people turned
out to vote (76% of the voter population), in comparison to only three million in the 1936
election (22% of the voter population).45 In the 1977 election, the biggest winners were Suárez’s
coalition of democratic candidates (gaining 47% of the vote) and socialists (gaining 29.3% of the
vote).46 In contrast, the biggest loser was the Francoists with only 8.3% of the vote.47 By voting
for two democratic parties as the majority without being bullied into voting for extremism, the
Spanish public successfully buried Francoism.48
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Spain became a quasi-federal state, given a democratic parliamentary monarchy was
established where citizens were represented in the central government through 17 geographic
autonomous regions and among local governments within the autonomies.49 In December 1978,
the new Spanish constitution was passed with 88% of support from the voting population.50
Political power was decentralized where the King was the head of state and commander in chief.
The parliament was established to be a bicameral legislature elected through universal suffrage.51
The new face of Spanish government successfully eradicated authoritarian ties to the Francoist
regime without completely dismantling the structure of the national government. For the
opposition to Franco, after nearly forty years of fighting for basic rights denied during the
authoritarian regime, their objectives had come true as democracy granted the freedom and
liberties so many had called for during Franco’s regime.

Chapter 2: Opposition to Franco’s Regime
Even before Franco’s death, there was mass mobilization of groups in support of
democracy.52 In the 1960s, cultural revival was structured around opposition to the Francoist
regime.53 But, it was mass opposition in the early 1970s which helped encourage transition to
democracy.54 However, the argument that mass opposition was a quintessential factor in the
transition is misleading. Public opposition did have an impact, but the argument neglects to
260.
Ibid, 262.
51
Ibid, 260.
52
Encarnación, 34.
53
Barton, 256.
54
Share, 36.
49
50

Barton,

10
address that Franco reacted to opposition with repression rather than democratic change.55 In
fact, mobilization was highly fragmented and therefore lacked the strength to force political
change.56 Rather than create democratic solutions, mass opposition created a political crisis.57
Nonetheless, by the time of Franco’s death, public opinion supported a complete abandonment of
Francoism and a free election to decide a new form of government.58

Section 1: Labor Strikes
The Spanish Civil War brought on the destruction of working class unions and parties.59
The 1944 Labor Law gave a significant number of laborers complete job security with the high
price of depriving laborers of unions and rights to workplace bargaining. In reality, this law was
enacted to deter labor conflicts by repressing opportunity for laborers to organize.60 But, with a
wave of economic instability in the 1950s, came a wave of strikes in support for increasing labor
wages.61 But, in general, strikes during the ‘50s were spontaneous and varied in issue. For
example, groups would protest for things like safer working conditions or proper washrooms.62
The goal of the frustrated workers was to achieve labor advancement through strikes.63
Between 1960 and 1975, there was an exponential increase in the number of labor strikes in
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Spain, even though strikes were illegal under Franco’s regime.64 In 1962, 45,000 Asturian miners
were joined by 50,000 Basque and 70,000 Catalan miners in a two month strike for higher
wages.65 This was the first instance where a strike was fully reported in the press.66 The strike
was even covered in American news. A New York Times article called for increased wages for
laborers as the editor believed this was the only way to stop the strikes.67 The 1970s saw
continued labor strikes in the building industry, mining, and metallurgy, but most especially in
the new car factories.68 The 1971 Syndical Labor Law passed and failed to stop labor unrest and
to meet the expectations for democratization.69 Although the labor strikes were clear calls to
action, there was limited impact on labor unrest.70

Section 2: University Opposition
Students have been using protest as a form of power for a long time.71 Spanish
universities were hotbeds for liberal opposition.72 The mid-1950s brought a new wave of
university opposition. Liberalization increased when “the generation of 1956” began university
as they were the first students to have not experienced the Spanish Civil War.73 In February
1956, student protesters and police clashed in the streets of Madrid. The protests of the 1950s
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were largely led by socialists, liberals, Marxists, and progressive Christians.74 Protests aimed to
expose the contradictions in Franco’s regime.75 This led to harsh repression of campus opposition
activity.76
The Education Law of 1970 was passed to make universities better at turning students
into cogs of the newly evolving capitalist society. But this law failed to solve the persistent
university protests.77 By 1973, every Spanish university was on strike.78 Students fought for the
short-term goal of democratization on campus and the long-term goal of democratization of
Spain.79 University protests embarrassed the Franco regime by eroding its legitimacy and
showing its lack of public support.80 Specifically, university opposition showed Franco’s failure
in establishing legitimacy with the Spanish youth.81
The student protests were born from several influences. The faculty on campuses were
divided in their obedience to Franco, with some hardline supporters and other liberal leaning
thinkers. The increase in protests shattered the traditional authority of the professors who
supported the regime, as students rejected their ideals and power.82 The repression by the regime
through denying students the right to free speech and a free press, spurred on more opposition.
The efforts to stamp out university dissent actually acted as fuel to the fire that propelled the
students to continue their efforts. Coinciding with student resentment, was the support of their
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resistance efforts by the Catholic Church as the Church shifted away from supporting the
Francoist regime, to be discussed in section three.83

Section 3: Church Opposition
In general, Spain’s commitment to the Catholic Church has set the nation apart from most
other Western European nations.84 There was mandatory religious education, massive turnout to
religious celebrations, and deeply embedded power granted to the church-- like control of
censorship.85 As Franco and the nationalists fought for the preservation of tradition and
conservatism, the Church sided with Franco during the Spanish Civil War and remained a close
ally until very late in Franco’s dictatorship.86 The Church and Spanish society’s relationship
began to wane near the end of the regime as well. Mass secularization and social change depleted
the importance of religion in the everyday Spanish household.87 By the time of Franco’s death,
rapid industrialization and socioeconomic change squeezed out much room for the Church.88
The Church was increasingly distanced from the Franco regime as brutalities and
injustice carried out by the regime became public knowledge. In May 1960, 400 Basque priests
published a denouncement of police repression and lack of liberty for peninsular people
(including those of the Basque Country).89 Furthermore, in 1963, 130 priests held a
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demonstration in Barcelona against police brutality. A group known as the Young Catholic
Workers had claimed, “to get involved in politics is a task for Christians.”90 The liberalization
of-- specifically, young-- Spanish clergy could no longer be ignored.
A stark change came in 1963 with Pope John XXIII and Vatican II.91 The new Pope
caused a spiritual renewal of the Spanish Church.92 Rome gave newfound support to progressive
clergy in Spain.93 Pope John XXIII and Vatican II supported the separation of church and state in
Spain.94 The new Vatican worked hard to give the Church a new social conscience which
explored the wrongdoings of leaders like Franco. Since Pope John XXIII’s standings and agenda
directly attacked the foundation of Franco’s regime, Spain was largely censored from any
publications by the Pope.95
Originally, the Spanish Church hierarchy remained loyal to Franco, even if lower rank
Church members were beginning to dissent. But even the Church could not resist radicalization
which eventually split the hierarchy.96 The young clergy-- especially those coming from
oppressed regions (Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia)-- more often supported
democracy.97 Even the Vatican council was divided, alienating the Francoist bishops.98 The shift
in thinking of many clergymen and the clear opposition from the Vatican was a threat Franco
recognized.
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By 1971, relations between the Church and the regime had gone entirely sour, which was
incredibly damaging to the regime.99 Until Franco’s death, the regime tried to repress the voice
of the Church. The regime enacted suspensions of church assemblies, fines for sermons against
the regime, censorship of church papers, and allowed illegal police entrance into churches.100 In
response to this attack on the Church, Spanish bishops demanded a revision of the 1953
Concordat between the Vatican and the Franco Regime. Furthermore, the bishops called for the
separation of church and state.101 The loss in support for the Francoist regime was the Church’s
attempt to reinforce the autonomy of the Church after seeing the cruelty the regime was capable
of.102 Even though the Church took a neutral stance to democratization in 1975, the decline in the
support of the regime significantly decreased the likelihood of Francoism continuing after
Franco’s death.103

Section 4: Terrorism
The unrest in Spain and sentiments against the Francoist regime led to the outbreak of
violence and terrorist activity across the nation. The largest and most well known faction of
terrorists was Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ( Our Basque Homeland), more commonly known simply
as ETA. But, this group was not alone in using violent measures to call for liberty and
democratization. There were also groups of Communists who resorted to guerilla warfare in
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order to resist repression and wreak havoc for the Francoists. The violence generally consisted of
minor political sabotage and primarily eluding the Civil Guard, Franco’s paramilitary police.104
The guerilla warfare tactic was not an effective way to promote change, but it was one some
chose in order to express their frustrations when Spain lacked the basic liberties of speech and
press for its public.
Three regions in Spain (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country) that differed from
the general Spanish society in language and culture felt alienated as part of the Spanish nation
since before Franco became dictator. For example, Catalonia has been campaigning for
independence since 1922.105 The Basque Country also felt like an outcast to the rest of Spain;
especially, because their native language is Basque, not Spanish.106 It is important to know, the
Basque Country is politically diverse, but as a whole it does not support or condone terrorism.
Originally when the ETA began their efforts, the Basque people renounced their actions,
claiming they were incompatible with Basque life and culture.107 The ETA was originally
founded in 1959 as a party supporting patriotism, democracy, and non-confessionalism. The
ETA was inspired by the wars for independence in Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam with ideologies
leaning towards Marxism.108
Terrorism blossomed where Francoist repression was most prominent.109 When efforts by
the ETA were repressed by the police, it further spurred on Basque nationalism and terrorist
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activity.110 But, terrorism was the type of opposition Franco was well equipped to handle. The
regime controlled the media and therefore controlled the narrative of the terrorist attacks.111 This
caused terrorist attacks to become counter productive, generally harming democratic supporters’
image. For example, the assasination of Carrero Blanco-- the then Prime Minister of Spain-- in
December 1973 weakened the reformist sector of the regime.112 Although, reformist sentiments
had soared after the Burgos Trial in December 1970 where nine ETA officers were sentenced to
death. The effects of this sentencing caused a scandal throughout Spain as pro-democratic
demonstrations across the nation called for the pardoning of the condemned. Internationally,
thirteen governments, the Pope, and Spanish bishops also called for a pardon.113 The national and
international pressure caused Franco to change their sentences from death to life in prison.114
In April 1975, terrorism was so frequent and concentrated that Franco announced martial
law in the Basque Country, handing governing rights over to the Spanish Army.115 Furthermore,
on August 27, 1975, the Antiterrorist Law went into effect. This law gave the police large swaths
of virtually unchecked power. Police officers were allowed to arrest anyone they suspected of
being terrorists and then torture the accused until they confessed. This law was so gruesome the
Spanish Army refused to take part in the executions of Spanish citizens condemned under this
new law.116 Though illegal, the efforts of regional opposition like ETA was able to thoroughly
denounce the Francoist regime to Franco’s supporters and the world as a whole.
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Chapter 3: International Influences
Section 1: International Democracy Takes Hold
During the late 20th century, Southern Europe experienced a wave of democratization.
Importantly, in 1974, Greece and Portugal both achieved democracy through revolution.117 The
Portugese Revolution was primarily a military coup against Portugal’s dictator Marcello
Caetano.118 The violence of the revolution in Portugal showed King Juan Carlos that a speedy
transition to democracy would be preferred to a slow one which could cause a violent revolution.
119

Juan Carlos was smart to make this connection as the democratic left of Spain did see

Portugal’s revolution as an example which they could replicate in Spain if needed.120 An
interviewer summarized the king’s outlook on other democratic transitions, claiming, “Spain
must spare no effort to avoid the disorder and chaos that Juan Carlos feels have been mistaken
for democracy in some countries.”121
The revolution in Portugal bore many similarities to the conditions in Spain. The coup
was organized primarily by majors and colonels of the Portuguese Army with support from
various military leaders. The organizers mainly included young officers who originally planned a
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protest movement in support for higher wages and rightful promotions.122 On top of better
working conditions, there was substantial sentiment in support of joining the European
Economic Community.123 Similar to Franco’s dictatorship, Portugal had suffered economic
decline from the isolation forced upon their nation by Caetano. These factors, along with loss of
support for the colonial wars in Africa, birthed the revolutionary Armed Forces Movement
(AFM).124
The Portuguese revolutionaries wanted relatively similar things to the Spanish public and
achieved them through the means of a coup. Juan Carlos recognized that in order to stay in
power, he had to facilitate the transition to democracy smoothly and quickly. On April 25, 1974,
the AFM removed the dictator and replaced the government with a new program. In this
program, a temporary president was appointed, to be replaced in the free elections of the
following year. Furthermore, censorship was lifted, and trade unions and political parties were
legalized. These were some of the goals of the opposition to Franco as well, and-- as this essay
will show-- these goals were achieved peacefully through the leadership of King Juan Carlos and
Adolfo Suárez.125

Section 2: Aid from the United States
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States sent massive aid to Europe in order to
support its fragile economies and ensure no other political actor like Hitler or Stalin would come
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to rise again. This aid came to be known as the Marshall Plan. From the United States’
perspective, Spain overall had stayed neutral with slight Axis leanings and remained a facist
regime. Thus, Spain was excluded from receiving any benefits from the Marshall Plan, despite
being in the midst of economic disaster that was so severe Spanish citizens were dying of
starvation.126 The humanitarian crisis gripping the Spanish people did not appeal to the United
State’s ethos, until the 1950s when the U.S.A was deeply invested in the Cold War. The United
States (among other Western nations) realized despite its fascism, Spain was an ally in the fight
against communism and the Soviet Union.127
In 1953, the Pact of Madrid was formed between Spain and the United States. Spain
received massive amounts of economic aid in exchange for granting the United States air bases
on Spanish soil. From the Pact of Madrid, Spain received the equivalent of $625 million in aid
between 1953 and 1957.128 The Spanish economy began to flourish as aid uplifted the nation and
encouraged reestablishing international trade. Between 1960 and 1970, Spanish GDP (gross
domestic product) rose from 12.07 billion USD to 40.88 billion USD. The aid provided by the
United States had important impacts on Spain. If Spain had not received supportive funds, the
likelihood that the Spanish economy could transition from autarky to an open market capitalist
economy would have been highly unlikely.129
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Section Three: Desire for International Involvement
Right after the creation of the United Nations in 1945, Spain was denied membership.
Spain was largely isolated from international affairs and trade through their own economic
policy of autarky and rejection of relations by UN members. But, by November 1950, the UN
lifted the total embargo and allowed its members to have relations with Spain.130 As the Soviet
Union continued to creep westward, seizing satellite nations, Western Europe realized Spain-though facist-- was an ally to them in the fight against communism.131 Therefore, in 1955, Spain
became a member of the United Nations.132 By 1960, Spain’s isolation from the rest of the world
had virtually ended with open relations with Europe and the United States.133
Further international involvement urged Spain to support democratization and conformity
to the rest of Western Europe. For example, many Spaniards desired Spanish membership into
the European Community (later to be established as the European Union) because it was said to
cause political stability, an increase in the standard of living, and the creation of rapid
modernization. The European Community consisted of three organizations to better help govern
member nations: the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community. The most important of these
organizations was the European Economic Community (EEC). The entrepreneurial elite of Spain
wanted greater access to the benefits of the EEC and therefore supported democratization.134 On
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January 1, 1986, Spain officially joined the European Community and all its connected
organizations including the EEC.135 Membership in 1986 reinforced the transition brought on by
urbanization because of the increased mechanization of agriculture and the power of agricultural
lobbyists in the European Community.136
Spain was harshly cut off from the rest of the world when Franco took power. Through
the policy of autarky, the Spanish economy deteriorated, leaving the Spanish people desperate,
hungry, and scared. As time went on, isolation began to wane and international relations were
established once more. But even membership in the UN or the European Community by itself
was not enough to establish democracy in Spain.137

Chapter 4: Young, Progressive Leadership
The new leaders that came to power upon Franco’s death were the most important factors
of ensuring Spain’s transition to democracy. From this, the transition to democracy was led from
the inside out.138 The first to democratize were the political leaders, with the last to feel the
effects being the Spanish public. The manner in which the transitioners went about instilling
democracy was through constitutional compromises in order to establish legitimacy for the new
government.139 It was the institutions of the old regime that were instructed to build the new
democracy.140 At all times, the transition had been controlled by the authoritarians of the old
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regime.141 But, it was key that Suárez chose young, progressive leaders to facilitate the transition.
142

This created a rejuvenation of the Francoist leadership.143Spain’s transition was carried out by

young, ex-Francoists who had never experienced the Civil War and had a future of opportunity
ahead of them.144

Section 1: King Juan Carlos
King Juan Carlos was the key to Spanish democratization. Juan Carlos’s goal was to
bring a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary monarchy to Spain. Though Juan Carlos was
highly invested in the future of Spain and democratization, it is also apparent that this form of
government also protected his position as king.145 But from Franco’s view, the king had not been
molded to be a democrat, but rather the heir to continue the fascist regime. On November 7,
1948, a ten year old Juan Carlos arrived in Spain to get an education in order to be molded into
Franco’s heir. His education consisted of a general high school diploma, four years of military
academy, and a two year intensive university program.146 Historians may never know what
shaped Juan Carlos or if his education liberalized him.147 But historians do know Juan Carlos had
become close to some political elites who were in favor of reform prior to his coronation.148
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Juan Carlos, as the heir, was relatively popular among Franco’s coalition.149 Franco chose
Juan Carlos as heir over Juan Carlos’s father-- Don Juan. Franco avoided choosing Don Juan
because he was too close in relation to King Alfonso XIII who had never abdicated; therefore,
the designation of Don Juan would undermine Franco’s legitimacy.150
On November 20, 1975, Fancisco Franco died; two days later, Juan Carlos was crowned
as king. Upon gaining power, Juan Carlos proclaimed himself as the “motor of change” for
Spain.151 Juan Carlos received substantial international support from Western nations.152 Juan
Carlos knew with the initiation of democratization, he would continue to be popular among
international allies.153
Juan Carlos appointed Torcuato Fernández Miranda as president of the Council of the
Realm-- an organ of the Francoist regime intended to advise the head of the state.154 This
appointment was part of Juan Carlos’s plan to instill progressive leaders in all facets of the
government. It was Miranda who ensured the Council of the Realm identified Adolfo Suárez as
nominee for Prime Minister.155 It was then up to Juan Carlos to formally approve his preferred
nominee. It was Suárez’s appointment that showed that the king was truly serious about bringing
democratic change to Spain. With Suárez’s appointment, the three top leadership positions of the
government had been filled by progressives.156 With these appointments, Juan Carlos was
confident in the transition to democracy. In August 1976, Juan Carlos promised Spain would
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transition to a democratic monarchy while giving a speech in front of the U.S. Senate.157 In 1981,
the goal of democracy was put to the test when Antonio Tejero led a coup attempt by holding
parliament hostage. Juan Carlos denounced the coup attempt and assured democracy had not
faltered. The next day, the hostages were released with no casualties to note. Juan Carlos was a
wicked leader and the key to supporting the new democracy of Spain. His control of the nation
and popularity among the people allowed the coup attempt to die before it came close to success
and the seeds of democracy to take root.158

Section 2: Adolfo Suárez
In his early career, Adolfo Suárez was a loyal Francoist bureaucrat.159 Suárez had spent
his entire political life working for Franco. For this, prior to Franco’s death, Suárez was not one
to be known for having progressive leanings.160 But, in secret, Aldolfo Suárez had been one of
the progressive political elites Juan Carlos had interacted with prior to coronation.161 Suárez did
not become well known until his renowned pro-democratic speech given in front of the Cortes,
prior to his appointment as Prime Minister. From this speech, Spaniards believed Suárez would
invest in a future for Spanish posterity rather than dwell in the past.162
Suárez was appointed as Prime Minister of Spain in July of 1976. The Prime Minister is
the leader of the Spanish government. In this position, Suárez was determined to take the legal
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route in establishing Spanish democracy.163 His goal was to amend the current constitution in
order to maintain legitimacy for the new government, rather than starting with a new
constitution.164 Suárez’s transition consisted of three major actions: to form a general consensus
of the people, to isolate the “Bunker” (the radical conservative opposition), and open the
channels of communication with the opposition.165
A major challenge of transition was facing the several groups of opposition. This was an
issue Suárez took head on. There were three major political forces Suárez had to persuade in
order to ensure transition, the democratic extremists, reform-oriented regime members, and the
military.166 In October 1976, the democratic extremists united in the call for the immediate
formation of democracy.167 Though the democratic extremists had faith Suárez would bring the
abolishment of Francoism, they gave up their dreams of a Third Republic. They gave this up by
agreeing to the restoration of the monarchy in exchange for free elections, trade unions, pardons
of political prisoners, and the legalization of parties.168 Suárez knew democracy would be
impossible to achieve without the support of the democratic extremists, which is why Suárez
approached the opposition with willingness to compromise.169 Under Suárez, the government
immediately contacted the opposition groups in order to negotiate.170 The biggest concern was
over electoral law, specifically the legalization of the Communist party.171
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In the end, despite authoritarian leadership in the transition, the opposition was able to
negotiate fair elections, civil liberties, and equal access to the media.172 These negotiations made
it easier for the opposition to accept Suárez’s version of transition.173 Furthermore, the
negotiations also acted as a way to avoid political fragmentation and polarization.174 After the
first six months of his appointment, Suárez had gained popular support, even the opposition
respected him.175
In November 1976, the Law of Political Reform was passed which voted the old Cortes
out of existence.176 The preamble of this reform read, “Democracy, the result of the effort and
work of the Spanish people, cannot be improvised.” This reminded the Spanish public of Suárez
and his government’s dedication to transition.177 This reform was the greatest triumph of the first
six months of Suárez and King Juan Carlos’s collaboration.178 The government had been so
confident the law would be approved, they had printed posters and reserved television segments
in order to celebrate the victory before it had even been passed.179 The Law of Political Reform
introduced the notion of popular sovereignty.180 The amendments of the Law of Political Reform
introduced proportional representation, where 17 autonomous regions were created to act as
representational districts.181 The reform established universal suffrage to elect the representatives
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and senators. By 1978, the reform had gained resounding popular support.182 Since Suárez had
come to power, Spain’s rate of political apathy had substantially decreased, a positive sign for
the reform and future involvement in the new democracy.183

Conclusion:
Spain was most importantly influenced by its leaders. First, under the dictatorship of
Francisco Franco. Then, King Juan Carlos provided Spain with a new set of leaders who worked
in collaboration to democratize Spain. The nation was redesigned from the inside out,
reorganizing the government and the role of politicians before expanding into structural change
for society as a whole.184 The nation was prepared for this change. Though there was hardliner
dissenters against democracy and Francoists still remain today, the Spanish majority was
supportive of change as seen in the vast number of protesters for democracy from university
campuses to the streets of labor strikes.
The 21st century seems to have brought a slew of reasons to believe in the gloom of
humanity from the 2008 Recession to the relentless war on terror. But the education of history-even close history of the late 20th century-- can instill hope. For many democracy stands as a
symbol of progress and freedom. In a world that seems to regress, reading about the triumphs of
human existence is a reminder of the resilience of humanity to rise above injustice. Spain’s
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transition to democracy is a mighty example of an authoritarian regime transitioning peacefully
to a democracy.185 It seemed to be a nearly impossible feat, but it was done.
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